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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
STATE OF UTAH, 
 
 Plaintiff/Appellee, 
 
vs. 
 
CHANCE L. ROBINSON, 
 
Defendant/Appellant. 
  
 
 
Case No. 20090015-CA 
 
 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
 
 
JURISDICTION 
Appellant Chance L. Robinson (“Mr. Robinson”), appeals from the trial 
court’s denial of his motion to quash the bindover by ruling dated September 15, 
2008, and the subsequent entry of judgment against him.  This Court has appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE: Whether the statute under which Mr. Robinson was convicted of 
possession or use of methamphetamine, Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-2(1), -8(2)(a)(i), 
is unconstitutional in that it makes a person criminally liable for his status, in 
 
 
violation of Robinson v. California, 370 U.S 660 (1962), and in that it violates the 
Due Process and Uniform Operation of Laws clauses of the United States and Utah 
Constitutions? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW:  An appellate court reviews a decision 
concerning the constitutionality of a statute for correctness.  Merrill v. Utah Labor 
Comm’n, 2009 UT 26, ¶ 5 (“The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law 
that we also review for correctness”).   
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
(Included in Addendum) 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(1)(c), (ii) 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i)  
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Mr. Robinson was originally charged with five separate counts:  
(1) possession or use of heroin; (2) possession of drug paraphernalia; (3) driving 
under the influence  (impaired, not blood alcohol content); (4) driving on a revoked 
or suspended license; and (5) operating a vehicle without insurance.  Record at 3-4. 
2. A preliminary hearing was held on these charges on June 17, 2008, at 
which time the magistrate dismissed the license and insurance charges for lack of 
evidence but bound Mr. Robinson over on the heroin, paraphernalia, and DUI 
charges.  Record at 133, pp. 31-32. 
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3. Shortly thereafter, on July 11, 2008, the State amended the 
information to add a charge of possession or use of methamphetamine.  Record at 
49-50. 
4. On July 29, 2009, a second preliminary hearing was held as to the 
methamphetamine charge only.  Record at 134.  At that time, the State conceded 
that it was prosecuting Mr. Robinson on the methamphetamine charge based solely 
on the fact that a blood test showed that he had the substance in his bloodstream.  
Record at 134, p. 8, lines 3-8. 
5. At that time, Mr. Robinson objected that this charge violated his 
constitutional rights and that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of 
probable cause.  Specifically, Mr. Robinson argued that prosecuting and convicting 
a person for merely having a controlled substance in his body or in his bloodstream 
is prohibited by Robinson v. California, 370 U.S 660 (1962), which made clear that 
the United States Constitution does not allow the state to prosecute someone 
because of their status; rather, only a person’s actions may subject a person to 
criminal liability.  Record at 134, p. 5-6.   
6. Overruling Mr. Robinson’s evidentiary objection, the Court bound 
over the charge but ordered briefing on the constitutional issue. Record at 134, p. 
11.  Accordingly, Mr. Robinson filed a motion to quash bindover based on this 
issue. Record at 58-73. 
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7. After briefing and argument on the issue, Record at 58-73, 75-86, 87-
94, the trial court overruled the motion.  Record at 98-102. 
8. On September 16, 2008, the State amended the DUI charge to DUI-
metabolite and Mr. Robinson entered a plea of guilty to the amended DUI and the 
methamphetamine charges.  Record at 135.  The methamphetamine plea was 
entered pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), that is, Mr. 
Robinson retained his right to appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion to quash.  
Record at 135, p. 4.1  
9. On November 25, 2008, Mr. Robinson was sentenced on both charges 
(as well as charges stemming from another case that is not the subject of this 
appeal) and judgment was entered against him.  Record at 117-21, 136. 
10. On that same date, Mr. Robinson filed his Notice of Appeal.  Record 
at 123-24. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. On August 10, 2007, Officer Ellswood reported to Officer Owens that 
he intended to stop the vehicle that Mr. Robinson was driving for not having 
insurance and the driver probably having a suspended license.  Record at 133, p. 6, 
11.   
                                                 
1 In addition, Mr. Robinson plead guilty to charges in a second, unrelated case.  
Record at 106-112, 135 pp. 2-4.  Neither these charges nor Mr. Robinson’s plea to 
the DUI-metabolite charge are the subject of this appeal. 
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2. During that traffic stop, the officer determined that Mr. Robinson 
might be impaired and asked Officer Owens to respond to the scene.  Record at 
133, p. 7. 
3. Officer Owens had Mr. Robinson get out of the car and perform 
certain field sobriety tests.  Record at 133, p. 8. 
4. At the conclusion of these tests, the officer concluded that Mr. 
Robinson was impaired and therefore placed him under arrest.  Record at 133, p. 8-
9. 
5. Thereafter, the officers had Mr. Robinson provide a blood sample. 
Record at 133, p. 10.  That sample came back positive for methamphetamine.  
Record at 134, pp. 4-5, 8 (specifically, although the exhibit is not in the record, at 
the preliminary hearing, the State introduced into evidence a toxicology report 
showing that Mr. Robinson had methamphetamine in his blood).  This is the sole 
evidence introduced that Mr. Robinson “possessed or used” methamphetamine.  
Record at 134, p.8. lines 3-8. 
6. Although the trial court stated in its ruling that “Defendant chose to 
ingest the drugs,” Record at 100, there is no evidence whatsoever in the record that 
Mr. Robinson acted voluntarily and knowingly to ingest the drugs.   
7. There was no evidence introduced as to where, when, or how the 
methamphetamine came to be in Mr. Robinson’s bloodstream. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Under both the federal and state Due Process Clauses, U.S. Const. amend 
XIV and Utah Const. art. I, § 7, a person should not be subject to criminal liability 
for matters that are outside their control.  Indeed, in 1962, the U.S. Supreme Court 
held as much in Robinson v. California, when it held that a person cannot 
constitutionally be convicted simply for being an addict.  Being an addict is a 
status and status crimes are unconstitutional, the Robinson Court held. 
Mr. Robinson’s conviction in this case falls within precisely the same ambit.  
Although his status was different from that of the Robinson defendant (one being 
an addict and the other having a controlled substance in his bloodstream), neither 
one of them were capable at the time of the arrest to change their condition – their 
status.   
In addition to being a prosecution for a status offense, as explained below, 
the statute under which Mr. Robinson was charged and convicted opens up 
criminal defendants to violations of the Uniform Operation of Laws Clause of the 
Utah Constitution.   
ARGUMENT 
I.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
An appellate court reviews a decision concerning the constitutionality of a 
statute for correctness.  Merrill v. Utah Labor Comm’n, 2009 UT 26, ¶ 5 (“The 
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constitutionality of a statute is a question of law that we also review for 
correctness”). 
II. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK 
Subject to certain exceptions not relevant here, under Utah Code Ann. § 58-
37-8(2)(a), “it is unlawful:  (i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to 
possess or use a controlled substance analog or a controlled substance.”  (Emphasis 
added.) 
The term “possess or use” is defined by statute to mean:  “the joint or 
individual ownership, control, occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging, 
maintaining, or the application, inhalation, swallowing, injection, or consumption, 
as distinguished from distribution, of controlled substances and includes 
individual, joint, or group possession or use of controlled substances.”  Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-2(1)(ii) (emphasis added).   
In turn, “consumption” as used in this definitional statute “means ingesting 
or having any measurable amount of a controlled substance in a person's body, but 
this Subsection (1)(c) does not include the metabolite of a controlled substance.”  
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(1)(c).  This latter provision was added to the statute in 
2003, shortly after the events underlying the Utah Supreme Court’s decision in 
State v. Ireland 2006 UT 17, 133 P.3d 396, but before the court’s decision in that 
case.  In Ireland, the State argued that a person’s having a controlled substance in 
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his or her bloodstream constituted “consumption” and therefore fell within the 
prohibited “possession or use” criminalized by Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i).  
The Ireland court rejected this reading of the term “consumption” and held that 
“consumption” was “a catchall term encompassing all methods of introducing 
controlled substances into the body.”  Id. ¶ 20 (emphasis added).   
In the course of arriving at this holding, the court noted the then-recent 
amendment to the definitions under the Utah Controlled Substances Act and stated 
that “[o]ur analysis of the possession or use subsection is . . . based on the version 
of the statute under which Ireland was charged, . . . and would likely be different if 
we were to interpret the current version of the statute.”  Id. ¶ 18.  Mr. Robinson 
does not argue that this dicta from the Utah Supreme Court is an improper reading 
of the statute in its current form.   
Instead, Mr. Robinson argues that, for the reasons discussed below, the 
statute in its current form is unconstitutional.   
III. MR. ROBINSON’S CONVICTION FOR POSSESSION OR USE OF 
METHAMPHETAMINE VIOLATES HIS RIGHTS UNDER 
ROBINSON v. CALIFORNIA 
 
A. Status Crimes Such as That with Which Mr. Robinson Is Charged 
Are Unconstitutional Under Both the United States and Utah 
Constitutions 
 
Consider a person that smokes a marijuana joint in Logan, Utah and then is 
driven by someone to St. George, beginning in Cache County and then passing 
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through Weber, Davis, Salt Lake, Utah, Juab, Millard, Beaver, and Iron Counties, 
before arriving in Washington County.  Under the terms of the current statute with 
its definition of “consumption,” that person would be subject to prosecution in ten 
separate counties in Utah and one county in Idaho where the actual consumption 
occurred, and would face up to at least five years of incarceration (assuming a six 
month sentence for each charge).  Indeed, with these multiple prosecutions and 
convictions, the likelihood of incarceration would increase because each 
subsequent court would consider the prior convictions as a basis for imposing a 
harsher sentence.2  This outrageous scenario would only be compounded should 
the individual decide to return from St. George to his Logan residence.  The fact 
that marijuana stays in the body for up to thirty days further compounds the 
problem. 
There are many other scenarios that are simply unacceptable as a 
constitutional matter but that are perfectly plausible under the current statute.  For 
instance, imagine the person that uses drugs in Nevada and then traveled to Utah, a 
completely different state.  Now, in addition to the problems of multiple 
prosecutions for what is actually only one crime, there is the problem of forum 
shopping by law enforcement because they can now pursue prosecution in either of 
                                                 
2 The same could happen even if the individual never left the county of the original 
offense because, as written, the statute would allow the State to arrest and 
prosecute the person many times prior to the drug leaving his system. 
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the two states.  What about the individual that smokes marijuana in Oregon or 
California (where enforcement and punishment of marijuana use are substantially 
more lax than in Utah) and then travels to Utah without bringing any of the drug 
with him, other than in his bloodstream?  Or, what if he uses it in a country where 
marijuana use is legal before flying to Utah?  In Utah, under the current statute, 
such a person can be prosecuted and punished for conduct that was perfectly legal 
where he was when he did it. 
As shown below, under United States Supreme Court precedent, that is truly 
cruel and unusual punishment.  But it also denies that person, who did nothing 
illegal or wrong after finishing the joint in Logan or Nevada or California or a 
foreign country, the opportunity to conform his actions to the law.  That violates 
the individual’s right to due process. 
B. The Case of Robinson v. California 
Nearly fifty years ago, the United States Supreme Court decided the case of 
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).  In Robinson, the defendant went to 
trial on the charge of violating § 11721 of the California Health and Safety Code.3  
                                                 
3 That section provided: 
 
"No person shall use, or be under the influence of, or be addicted to 
the use of narcotics, excepting when administered by or under the 
direction of a person licensed by the State to prescribe and administer 
narcotics. It shall be the burden of the defense to show that it comes 
within the exception.  Any person convicted of violating any 
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Id. at 660.  At trial, an officer testified that he had examined the defendant’s arms 
and found them to be scarred and bearing numerous needle marks.  Id. at 661.  The 
officer further testified that, under questioning, the defendant admitted occasional 
use of narcotics.  Id.   Another officer gave expert testimony that the scarring and 
needle marks were the result of the use of unsterile hypodermic needles.  Id. at 
662.  The defendant testified and denied the confession and explained the scarring 
and other marks as resulting from an allergic condition contracted when he was in 
the military.  Id.  This was corroborated by two other witnesses.  Id.   
The jury was instructed that it was a violation of the law for a person “either 
to use narcotics, or to be addicted to the use of narcotics.”  Id.  The judge further 
explained that  
[t]hat portion of the statute referring to the “use” of narcotics is based upon 
the “act” of using.  That portion of the statute referring to “addicted to the 
use” of narcotics is based upon a condition or status.  They are not identical. 
. . .  To be addicted to the use of narcotics is said to be a status or condition 
                                                                                                                                                             
provision of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be 
sentenced to serve a term of not less than 90 days nor more than one 
year in the county jail.  The court may place a person convicted 
hereunder on probation for a period not to exceed five years and shall 
in all cases in which probation is granted require as a condition 
thereof that such person be confined in the county jail for at least 90 
days.  In no event does the court have the power to absolve a person 
who violates this section from the obligation of spending at least 90 
days in confinement in the county jail." 
 
Id. at 660 n.1. 
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and not an act.  It is a continuing offense and differs from most other 
offenses in the fact that [it] is  chronic rather than acute; that it continues 
after it is complete and subjects the offender to arrest at any time before he 
reforms.  The existence of such a chronic condition may be ascertained from 
a single examination, if the characteristic reactions of that condition be 
found present. 
 
Id. at 662-63 (alterations by the Court).  Finally, the judge instructed the jury that it 
could convict if it found either that the defendant had used narcotics or that he was 
addicted thereto.  Id. at 663. The jury convicted and the state appellate courts 
affirmed.  Id. at 663-64.  
In its analysis, the Supreme Court noted that it was bound by the state 
courts’ interpretation that the statute prohibited a person from either using or being 
addicted to narcotics.  Id. at 666.  “The statute, therefore, is not one which punishes 
a person for the use of narcotics, for their purchase, sale, or possession, or for 
antisocial or disorderly behavior resulting from their administration. . . . Rather, we 
deal with a statute which makes the ‘status’ of narcotic addiction a criminal 
offense, for which the offender may be prosecuted ‘at any time before he 
reforms.’”  Id.  “California has said that a person can be continuously guilty of this 
offense, whether or not he has ever used or possessed any narcotics within the 
State, and whether he has been guilty of any antisocial behavior there.”  Id.   
The Supreme Court held the conviction to be a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  The Court determined that addiction is an illness, not unlike leprosy 
or venereal disease, and asserted that convicting a person of having either of those 
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diseases would be universally recognized as the infliction of a cruel and unusual 
punishment. Id. at 666-67.  The Court supported this conclusion by noting that 
addiction is a disease that may be contracted innocently or involuntarily.  Id. at 
667. 
C. Like the Statue at Issue in Robinson, the Utah Controlled 
Substance Act Makes One’s Status Criminal and That Is 
Unconstitutional 
 
The Utah statute, like the California statute at issue in Robinson, in addition 
to making the traditional use of controlled substances illegal, also makes their 
after-effects illegal.  In the case of the California statute, it was the after-effect of 
being addicted.  In the case of Utah’s section 58-37-2(1)(c), it is the after-effect of 
having a controlled substance in one’s body.  Each of these is a status offense; 
there is no particular conduct that is prohibited by the relevant portion of the 
statute.  Instead, it is simply the status of having been affected by a controlled 
substance at some previous time.   
While it is certainly true that in the large majority of cases, a person will be 
addicted to narcotics or a person will have a controlled substance in his or her body 
only because they somehow ingested it, the state remains free to prosecute these 
individuals for that actual ingestion.  Indeed, the State is perfectly free to use the 
status of being an addict or of having a controlled substance in the body as 
evidence of that ingestion.   
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What the State is not free to do is impose punishment for something that it 
has not proven was a voluntary act by the defendant.  The Supreme Court noted 
that addiction may occur innocently and involuntarily.  The same is true of having 
a controlled substance in one’s body.  For instance, some third party may inject the 
controlled substance into the defendant’s body without their knowledge or even 
over their objection.  Alternatively, a person may ingest the controlled substance 
not realizing what it is they are taking into themselves.  Additionally, a person 
attending a party could unintentionally inhale second hand smoke from another 
person and then be subject to being criminally charged in every county he passes 
through in the State of Utah for the next thirty days. 
In such circumstances, as the Supreme Court noted, the State is perfectly 
free to require the person to take remedial steps to prevent further harm from the 
presence of the condition (addiction or having the substance in the body) but it 
may not punish them for it.  To do so would be cruel and unusual punishment 
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.   
In addition, it violates the very notion of due process imposed on the states 
by the Fourteenth Amendment.   
Under the due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the Constitution of the United States and of article I, section 7 of the 
Utah Constitution, government may not deny a person life or liberty 
except on principles "consistent with the fundamental principles of 
liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political 
institutions."  Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316-17, 47 S. Ct. 
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103, 71 L. Ed. 270 (1926).  The due process clauses protect those 
principles that are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" and 
without which "a fair and enlightened system of justice would be 
impossible."  Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 82 L. Ed. 288, 
58 S. Ct. 149 (1937), overruled on unrelated part, Benton v. 
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795, 23 L. Ed. 2d 707, 89 S. Ct. 2056 
(1969). 
 
State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 374 (Utah 1995) (Stewart, Assoc. C.J., dissenting). 
If due process means anything more than simply having notice and a hearing 
before one’s life, liberty, or property may be taken by the State,4 it certainly means 
that the State may not punish someone for something that is beyond that person’s 
ability to control.  Swayne v. LDS Social Servs., 795 P.2d 637, 642 (Utah 1990); 
Ellis v. Social Services Department of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints, 615 P.2d 1250, 1256 (Utah 1980); Brockert v. Skornicka, 711 F.2d 1376, 
1381 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Sherpix, Inc., 512 F.2d 1361, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 
1975).  It is clear that a statute that punished someone because of their race would 
be unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment.  To a large degree, that is 
                                                 
4 Brigham Young Univ. v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 2007 UT 17, ¶ 28, 156 P.3d 
782 (“The bare essentials of due process thus mandate adequate notice to those 
with an interest in the matter and an opportunity for them to be heard in a 
meaningful manner” (emphasis added)); Foote v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 808 P.2d 
734, 735 (Utah 1991) (holding that the Utah Constitution affords at least as great a 
protection of liberty interests when compared as the federal Due Process Clause); 
State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1271 (Utah 1988) (holding certain statutory 
requirements violated due process requirements of the Utah Constitution because 
they were arbitrary and capricious); Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 
348 (Utah 1989) (holding unconstitutional a cap on damages as violative of state 
constitutional due process). 
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because there is nothing a person can do to change his or her race; it is a matter not 
within the person’s control.  The same would be true for punishing someone 
because of their height or hair color.  It would even extend to matters over which a 
person does have some control, for instance, their weight. 
In the case of illegal drugs, once the person has ingested them (for which 
they can constitutionally be punished, if the act was done knowingly and 
intentionally), there is nothing that that person can do to change his status of 
having the illegal substance in his body or being addicted thereto, except to wait 
for nature to take its course.  Assuming no further introduction of controlled 
substance, over time, the addiction will fade and the controlled substance will 
leave the body.  Until it does, however, under the Utah and California statutes, the 
person remains subject to repeated prosecution and there is nothing he or she can 
do to prevent it.5   
In this case, the only evidence the State offered at the preliminary hearing 
was that there was methamphetamine in Mr. Robinson’s blood.  There was no 
evidence as to how that methamphetamine got there, whether it was ingested 
voluntarily, or even where it was ingested.  Given the state of the record in this 
                                                 
5 A prosecution for traditional possession of a controlled substance does not have 
this problem because a person can refuse to take possession of the item or, if he 
somehow came into possession unknowingly, he can dispose of it immediately 
upon becoming aware that he is in possession. 
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case, the State has not shown adequate evidence (indeed, it has not shown any 
evidence) that the “possession or use” that it charged was “knowing[] and 
intentional[]” as required by the possession statute.  Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i).  More importantly, given the state of the record, it is certainly possible 
that other counties may charge Mr. Robinson for the same “possession or use.”    
Most important of all, once Mr. Robinson had ingested the controlled substance 
(assuming, without supporting evidence, he did so voluntarily), there was nothing 
he could do to conform with the law at time of his arrest. Of course, if Mr. 
Robinson actually did voluntarily ingest the methamphetamine, the State was free 
to prosecute him for that in the jurisdiction and venue where such ingestion 
occurred.  There is no evidence in the present case that the original ingestion of a 
controlled substance, whether voluntary or not, occurred in Utah County or even 
Utah for that matter.  Similarly, the State was also free to pursue a prosecution of 
him for driving under the influence, which it has done successfully.6  The Court, 
however, should not allow the State to skimp on its obligation to prove that Mr. 
Robinson actually acted to break the law. 
The trial court ruled that Mr. Robinson “chose to ingest the drugs.  He had 
the choice of throwing them away or destroying them prior to ingesting them.  
However, once he made the choice to ingest the drugs and drive, he also made the 
                                                 
6 This appeal will not in  any way impact that prosecution or Mr. Robinson’s 
conviction or sentence as to that count.   
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choice to be prosecuted for drug use or possession because it may create 
substantial public health and safety hazards . . . .”  Record at 100 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).   
In this reasoning, the trial court erred.  Specifically, Mr. Robinson is not 
arguing that he is somehow immune or protected against a DUI prosecution.  
Indeed, he has entered his plea to and has been sentenced on that charge.  It is clear 
that a person who is intoxicated, regardless of how they became intoxicated 
(voluntarily or involuntarily, knowingly or unknowingly), is not allowed to operate 
a motor vehicle while in that condition.  Conditions and statuses may, of course, 
restrict the activities a person is allowed to engage in.  Accordingly, in the present 
case, Mr. Robinson is not appealing his DUI conviction. 
That, however, is not what happened in the prosecution of this charge.  
Rather, the government prosecuted Mr. Robinson for simply existing while drugs 
were in his body.  The State does not have the evidence to prosecute actual 
ingestion of drugs (both because it cannot determine proper venue and because it 
cannot prove that Mr. Robinson in fact ingested them knowingly and voluntarily).  
Instead, it seeks to punish him solely for his status.   
This violates both the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause and the Due 
Process Clause of the United States Constitution.  U.S. Const. amend. VIII, XIV.  
Accordingly, the Court should reverse the conviction. 
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IV. The Crime with Which Mr. Robinson Is Charged Is Unconstitutional 
Under the Utah Constitution 
 
A. The Crime Charged Against Mr. Robinson Violates the Utah 
Constitution’s Due Process Clause 
 
Mr. Robinson has been convicted solely for having methamphetamine in his 
bloodstream.  The prosecution has admitted that this is the entire theory of its 
entire case.  He was not convicted of ingesting methamphetamine.  There was no 
testimony from any witness at the preliminary hearing that Mr. Robinson actually 
ingested the methamphetamine into his body in a voluntary or knowing manner.  
From the state of the record, there is no way to know how the methamphetamine 
came to be in Mr. Robinson’s body.  Nor, assuming that Mr. Robinson did in fact 
ingest the controlled substance voluntarily, is there any evidence as to where such 
ingestion occurred. 
Accordingly, for all the record shows, Mr. Robinson may now stand 
convicted of a crime caused by the forceful injection of methamphetamine into his 
bloodstream over his conscious objection.  Or it may have been administered to 
him while he was asleep.  Or he may have ingested it while he was in a jurisdiction 
where such ingestion was legal.   
The point is, once it was in his system, whether it got there in violation of 
Utah law or not, there is nothing Mr. Robinson could do to conform his actions to 
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the requirements of the “consumption” statute.  All he could do was wait until his 
body’s natural metabolic processes cleansed his system. 
As noted above, if due process of Utah Const. art. I, § 7, is to mean anything 
beyond notice and a hearing, it has to mean that a person cannot be prosecuted and 
convicted for something beyond his ability to control.  Swayne v. LDS Social 
Servs., 795 P.2d 637, 642 (Utah 1990); Ellis v. Social Services Department of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 615 P.2d 1250, 1256 (Utah 1980).  In 
this case, the State has done just that and the Utah Constitution requires this Court 
to reverse that action. 
B. Mr. Robinson’s Prosecution Violates the Constitutional 
Requirement of Uniform Operation of Laws 
 
Section 24 of Article I of the Utah Constitution provides:  “All laws of a 
general nature shall have uniform operation.”  This provision has been interpreted 
as requiring the State to treat similarly situated people similarly.   
Operational uniformity . . . requires that persons similarly situated be 
treated similarly.  Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah 1984).  
We have adopted a two-part test to measure whether a statute meets 
this standard:  “First, a law must apply equally to all persons within a 
class.  Second, the statutory classifications and the different treatment 
given the classes must be based on differences that have a reasonable 
tendency to further the objective of the statute.” Id. (citations 
omitted); accord Schofield, 2002 UT 132 at P12; State v. Mohi, 901 
P.2d 991, 997 (Utah 1995); Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 
P.2d 634, 637 (Utah 1989). 
 
State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34 ¶ 33, 114 P.3d 585. 
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In this case, the effect of the portion of the statute that allows for a 
possession or use conviction based solely on the presence of a controlled substance 
being within a defendant’s body violates the uniform operation of laws clause.  For 
instance, two people who both ingested an equal amount of a controlled substance 
at the same time should be equally subject to prosecution.  How long the substance 
will remain in each person’s body, however, will vary based on many factors, 
including their respective body sizes, their respective bodies’ general metabolism 
rate, and the type of controlled substance at issue.  This has the effect of subjecting 
one of them to prosecution for a longer period of time.  Accordingly, the law does 
not apply equally to all people within a class.   
This last factor – the type of controlled substance – adds even more to the 
injustice of the statute at issue here because it will cause some people to be subject 
to prosecution for longer periods of time even though they have committed a less 
serious crime.  For instance, our legislature has defined simple use or possession of 
marijuana to be a class B misdemeanor, while simple use or possession of 
methamphetamine, cocaine, and heroin are all defined as felonies with much more 
serious potential penalties, as well as the loss of various civil liberties that are not 
affected by a misdemeanor conviction.  See Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(2)(b)(ii),  
-(2)(d).  Clearly, the legislature has, as it is entitled to do, come to the judgment 
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that possession of these other substances is more serious than is possession of 
marijuana.   
It is generally, recognized, however, that marijuana remains in the body of a 
user for a period much longer than do heroin, cocaine, or methamphetamine.  This 
creates a situation where a user of a minor illegal drug is exposed to prosecution 
for a much longer period than is the user of a felony-level substance.  In other 
words, in the current “consumption” statute, the legislature has effected a 
classification treating marijuana use more harshly than the use of other controlled 
substances, even though it is clearly the legislatively-enacted policy of this State 
that marijuana use is a less serious violation.  Thus, the classifications created by 
the legislature are not reasonably related to the legislature’s objectives.  This is a 
violation of the Uniform Operation of Laws clause and should not be permitted by 
the Court.  Utah Const. art. I, § 24. 
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CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s denial of Mr. 
Robinson’s motion to quash and his subsequent conviction and sentence should be 
reversed.   
Respectfully submitted this 10th day of June, 2009. 
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ADDENDUM 1 
(Relevant Statutory Provisions) 
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 58-37-2.    Definitions. 
     (1) As used in this chapter: 
     . . .  
     (c) "Consumption" means ingesting or having any measurable amount of 
a controlled substance in a person's body, but this Subsection (1)(c) does not 
include the metabolite of a controlled substance. 
    . . .  
     (ii) “Possession” or “use” means the joint or individual ownership, 
control, occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging, maintaining, or the 
application, inhalation, swallowing, injection, or consumption, as 
distinguished from distribution, of controlled substances and includes 
individual, joint, or group possession or use of controlled substances. For a 
person to be a possessor or user of a controlled substance, it is not required 
that the person be shown to have individually possessed, used, or controlled 
the substance, but it is sufficient if it is shown that the person jointly 
participated with one or more persons in the use, possession, or control of 
any substances with knowledge that the activity was occurring, or the 
controlled substance is found in a place or under circumstances indicating 
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that the person had the ability and the intent to exercise dominion and 
control over it. 
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     58-37-8.   Prohibited acts -- Penalties. 
     (1) Prohibited acts A -- Penalties: . .  
     (2) Prohibited acts B -- Penalties: 
     (a) It is unlawful: 
     (i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled 
substance analog or a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid 
prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of his 
professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter; . . . . 
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ADDENDUM 2 
(Ruling re:  Defendant’s Motion to Quash Bindover) 
